Mood and persuasion: affective states influence the processing of persuasive communications by Schwarz, Norbert et al.
www.ssoar.info
Mood and persuasion: affective states influence the
processing of persuasive communications
Schwarz, Norbert; Bless, Herbert; Bohner, Gerd
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Schwarz, N., Bless, H., & Bohner, G. (1990). Mood and persuasion: affective states influence the processing of
persuasive communications. (ZUMA-Arbeitsbericht, 1990/03). Mannheim: Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und
Analysen -ZUMA-. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-67205
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Msad and Persuasion:
A ffec t iv e  5 ta tes  Influence the Processing o f  
Persuasive Communications
Norbert Schwarz, Herbert B less ,  Gerd Bohner
Z U MA - A r b e i t s b e r i c h t  Nr.  9 0 / 0 3
.Zentrum Für Umf r age n ,  Met hoden und 
A n a l y s e n  e . V .  (ZUMA) 
P o s t f a c h  12 21 55 
D- 6 8 0 0  Mannheim 1

Seit Juli 1 983 sind die ZUMA-Arbeitsber ichte 
in zwei Reihen aufgeteilt:
Die ZUMA-Arbeitsberichte (neue Folge) haben 
eine hausinterne Begutachtung durchlaufen und 
werden vom Geschäfts führenden Direktor zusam­
men mit den übrigen Wissenschaftlichen Lei­
tern herausgegeben. Die Berichte dieser Reihe 
sind zur allgemeinen Weitergabe nach außen 
bestimmt.
Die Z Ü M A - T e c h n i s e h e n  Berichte dienen zur 
hausinternen Kommunikation bzw. zur Unter­
richtung externer Kooperationspartner. Sie 
sind nicht zur allgemeinen Weitergabe b e ­
stimmt .

The enclosed reprint replaces ZUMA-Arbeitsbericht No. 90/03 by 
the same authors.
N. Schwarz, H. Bless, & 6. Bohner (1991). Mood an persuasion. 
Affective states influence the processing of persuasive 
communications. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental 




MOOD AND PERSUASION: 
AFFECTIVE STATES INFLUENCE 






Attempts to persuade another person are often accompanied by efforts to 
change this person’s mood. From little kids who say nice things 10 Daddy before 
they ask him a favor, to professionals in the advertising business who create 
funny and entertaining television spots to persuade consumers, we are all famil­
iar with persuasion strategies that include attempts to change the recipient's 
mood. The frequent use o f this persuasion strategy, and practitioners' faith in it, 
suggests that it may actually be effective. However, the exact mechanisms by 
which recipients' affective states may mediate persuasion processes are not yet 
well understood. In the present article, we shall outline different mediating 
processes that are consistent with current theorizing on the interplay of emotion 
and cognition, and shall evaluate these assumptions in the light o f the available 
evidence.
In line with current theorizing on persuasion, we shall present our arguments 
in the context of the "cognitive response” approach to persuasion and attitude 
change (Greenwald, 1968; Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981). According to this 
approach, recipients of a persuasive communication may arrive at an attitude 
judgment by one of two ways. On the one hand, they may carefully consider the 
content o f the message, paying close attention to the implications o f (he present­
ed arguments. On the other hand, recipients may not engage in a thorough 
consideration of message content, but may rely on simple cues, such as the 
communicator’s prestige or likableness. While the former, content-oriented, pro­
cessing strategy is known as "system atic processing" (Chaiken, 1980, 1987), or
a d v a n c e s  in  e x p e r i m e n t a l  
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the "central roule to persuasion”  (Petiy and Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b), the latter 
strategy is known as "heuristic processing,”  or the “ peripheral route to 
persuasion.”
If a central route o f persuasion is traveled, or— in other terms— the message is 
processed systematically, the resulting attitude change is a function of the recip­
ients' cognitive responses to the message: the more thoughts come to mind that 
support the position advocated in the message, the more pronounced the intended 
attitude change will be. Accordingly, messages that present strong arguments arc 
more effective than messages that present weak or flawed arguments. The quality 
o f the message affects attitude change less, however, if the peripheral route is 
traveled, or— in other terms— the message is processed heuristically. Accord­
ingly, comparisons of the impact of strong and weak arguments are a key criteri­
on in distinguishing between a central, or systematic, and a peripheral, or 
heuristic, route to persuasion, and we shall draw heavily on this criterion in the 
remainder of this article.
Which route to persuasion is more likely to be used depends on recipients' 
motivation and ability. If the recipient is sufficiently motivated and able to 
process the content o f the message, the central route is likely to predominate. 
The peripheral roule, on the other hand, is likely to be used if motivation and/or 
ability are low.
Current theorizing on the interplay of affect and cognition suggests at least five 
ways in which recipients' mood may influence persuasion processes within this 
genera] framework (see also Petty, Cacioppo, & Kasmer, 1988). Each of these 
possibilities has different implications for recipients’ attitude change, their cog­
nitive responses to the message, and their evaluation of the presented arguments, 
as will be outlined below. Moreover, the various assumptions differ in the 
processing stages at which they hypothesize affective states to have an impact. 
Some assumptions imply an impact o f affective slates on the encoding of the 
persuasive message, whereas others imply an impact o f affective states at the 
judgment stage. In the former case, mood effects should be obtained only if the 
mood is present at the lime of exposure to the message; in the latter case, they 
should be obtained only if the mood is present at the time of judgment. We shall 
first discuss these different process assumptions and then review data that bear on 
them.
II. Theoretical Approaches to Mood and Persuasion
A. MOOD AS A PERIPHERAL CUE HYPOTHESIS
Recipients' affective stale may itself serve as a peripheral cue if it becomes 
associated with the attitude object or with the source. This prediction has a long
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tradition in learning theory approaches to attitude change (Berkowitz Knurek. 
1969; Razran, 1940; A. W. Staats & C. K. Staats, 1958; Siaats, Staats, & 
Crawford, 1962; C. K. Siaats & A. W. Staats, 1957; Zanna, Kiesler, & Pilkoms, 
1970). Within the learning theory framework, a number o f studies used a first 
order classical conditioning approach by repeatedly pairing word stimuli with 
pleasant or unpleasant experiences, such as (he offset vs. onset o f electric shock 
(Zanna et al., 1970), music (e.g ., Gom, 1982), or food (e .g ., Dabbs & Janis, 
1965). In other studies, higher order conditioning procedures were employed, 
pairing concepts or nonsense syllables with words that have positive or negative 
evaluative meaning (e.g ., Staats &  Staats, 1958).
In both paradigms, it could be demonstrated that subjects expressed more 
positive (or negative, respectively) attitudes toward concepts that had repeatedly 
been paired with positive (negative) stimuli. Moreover, the induced attitudes 
generalized to semantically or categorically similar attitude objects (Berkowitz & 
Knurek, 1969; Zanna et al., 1970). While some of the earlier studies (A. W. 
Staats Si C. K. Siaats, 1958; C. K. Staats & A. W. Staats, 1957) arc open to 
criticism concerning demand characteristics inherent in the experimental pro­
cedures (cf. Page, 1969), this is not the case for the Berkowitz and Knurek 
(1969) and Zanna et al. (1970) studies, as these authors used elaborate cover 
stories and separated the conditioning procedure from the attitude assessment.
Thus, the available evidence suggests that attitudes toward verbal concepts can 
be formed while these concepts are paired with unpleasant or pleasant experi­
ences. Within an information-processing framework, these effects can be rein­
terpreted as effects o f affective states serving as a peripheral cue. However, it is 
yet unclear if cue effects o f this kind do occur in a persuasion setting, when a 
complex message is presented while recipients are in a positive or negative 
affective state, or if they are restricted to situations in which little, if any, content 
information is available. Moreover, most o f the support for the classical condi­
tioning model o f attitudes comes from studies in which previously neutral or new 
attitude objects were presented, whereas attitudes toward stimuli that were al­
ready positive or negative to begin with seem to be unaffected (e.g ., Zanna et 
at., 1970).
Similar predictions may be derived from the assumption that affective states 
may serve informative functions. According to this hypothesis (Schwarz, 1987, 
1988, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988), individuals may simplify complex 
judgmental tasks by using their affective reaction to the attitude object as an 
informational basis according lo a “ How do I feel about it?”  heuristic. In doing 
so, however, it is difficult to distinguish between one's affective reaction to the 
objcct o f judgment and one’s preexisting mood slate. Accordingly, individuals 
may mistake their preexisting feelings as a reaction to the message, which may 
result in more favorable evaluations under good than under bad mood.
Note, however, that individuals will rely on their affective state as a basis of 
judgment only if its diagnostic value for the judgment at hand has not been called
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into question. In line with this assumption, Schwarz and Clore (1983) observed 
that individuals evaluated (heir life more positively when interviewed on sunny 
rather than rainy days, reflecting their mood at (he time of judgment. However, 
when (heir attention was drawn to the weather as a potential source of their 
current mood, its impact was eliminated. Specifically, respondents called on 
rainy days reported being as happy and satisfied with their life as respondents 
called on sunny days, when the interviewer, who pretended to call from out of 
town, opened the interview with a private aside, "H ow ’s the weather down 
there?”  This manipulation presumably directed respondents' atteniion to the 
weather, suggesting that their current feelings may be due to this transitory 
influence, and may (hus not provide a diagnostic basis of information for evaluat­
ing the overall quality o f their life. Accordingly, a measure of current mood, 
assessed at the end of the interview, was correlated with judgments o f life 
satisfaction only if respondents’ attention was not drawn to the weather. This and 
related research (see Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1988, for reviews) 
suggests that recipients o f a persuasive communication may use their feelings at 
the time of judgment as a peripheral cue only if their informational value has not 
been called into question.
In summary, both the learning theory and the “ mood-as-information”  variant 
of the hypothesis, that moods may serve as peripheral cues, imply that mood 
effects on attitude change should be obtained primarily if a peripheral route to 
persuasion is traveled, but should be weak if a central route is traveled. Accord­
ingly, they predict a  main effect of mood on altitude change, which should be 
independent of the quality o f (he presented arguments. Moreover, both notions 
do not predict effects of mood on message-related cognitive responses or recall. 
Both notions differ, however, with regard to the processing stage at which the 
impact is supposed to occur. Whereas the mood-as-information hypothesis as­
sumes that an impact o f affective states reflects respondents' feelings at the time 
of judgment, independently of what evoked these feelings in the first place, this 
is not (he case for the learning theory approaches. Specifically, the classical 
conditioning approach requires that ihe attitude object and affectively laden 
stimuli be paired at the encoding stage, whereas an instrumental conditioning 
approach requires that previous related attitude judgments be paired with affec­
tive consequences (e.g ., Cialdini & Insko, 1969). All of these assumptions, 
however, have received most support in research on the formation of new at­
titudes, rather than in research on attitude change.
B. MOOD CONGRUENCY HYPOTHESIS
As a second hypothesis, one may assume [hat recipients’ mood states may 
influence the associations generated during exposure to the message, due to the
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increased accessibility of mood congruent material stored in memory (Bower, 
1981; Isen, Shalker, Clark, &. Karp. 1978; see Blaney. 1986, for a review). This 
may result either in more positive elaborations of the content of the message, or 
in more positive reactions to peripheral cues, such as the appearance of the 
communicator, when recipients are in a good rather than bad mood. According­
ly, the mood congruent recall hypothesis predicts a main effect o f mood on 
attitude measures, with greater persuasion under good than under bad moods. 
However, this main effect on attitude measures may or may not be paralleled by 
effects of mood on cognitive responses, depending on whether the mood con­
gruent associations pertained to the content of the message or to peripheral cues. 
According to this model, the impact o f mood states may occur at the encoding 
stage, that is, when the message is elaborated, or at the judgment stage, if the 
judgment is based on what can be recalled from a previously encoded message. 
In either case, the model holds that the impact o f mood is independent o f the 
source to which one's mood is attributed (cf. Schwarz & Clore, 1988).
C. CHANGE IN CRITERIA HYPOTHESIS
As a third possibility, subjects' affective state may influence the criteria that 
they use to evaluate the quality o f the message. Specifically, it seems plausible to 
suppose that subjects in a bad mood may use harsher criteria to evaluate a 
persuasive message than subjects in a good mood. If so, subjects in a bad mood 
should evaluate the message less favorably and should show less attitude change 
than subjects in a good mood. This would imply a main effect of mood on both 
attitude change and the relative number of supportive and refutational cognitive 
responses that is independent of the quality o f the presented arguments. An 
interaction prediction could only be derived if one assumed that mood affects 
recipients' threshold for the acceptability o f an argument, and that all arguments 
above or below (he threshold are treated equally, without further consideration of 
their absolute level of plausibility. In that case, individuals in a negative mood 
may be receptivc of strong arguments and dismissive of weak arguments, where­
as individuals in a positive mood may be equally receptive to strong and weak 
arguments, reflecting a lower threshold. In either case, the change-in-criteria 
hypothesis implies that mood effects should only be observed when the mood is 
present at the time of exposure to the message.
D. MOTIVATIONAL HYPOTHESES
Fourth, recipients’ affective state may influence their motivation to elaborate 
on the content of the message. In this regard, it has been hypothesized that
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moods may affect individuals' preferred processing style, and that persons in a 
good mood are more likely to engage in simplified, heuristic processing strat­
egies, whereas persons in a bad mood may spontaneously engage in more 
effortful and detail-oriented analytic processing strategies (Schwarz, 1990; see 
also Fiedler, 1988; lsen, 1987; Kuhl, 1983, for related hypotheses). This predic­
tion is derived from the assumption that “ emotions exist for the sake of signaling 
stales of the world that have to be responded to, or that no longer need response 
and action" {Frijda, 1988, p. 354).
If so, negative feelings may inform individuals that their current situation is 
problematic. They may therefore trigger processing styles that are adequate for 
analyzing the problematic situation in order to determine adequate reactions. 
However, any mechanism that increases the accessibility of relevant procedural 
knowledge may also increase the likelihood that the respective procedures will be 
applied to other tasks to which they are applicable while the individual is in a 
negative affective state. Moreover, individuals in a negative state may be moti­
vated to avoid erroneous decisions in a situation that is already characterized as 
problematic. Consistent with this assumption, a large body of literature indicates 
that individuals are more likely to use effortful, detail-oriented, analytical pro­
cessing strategies spontaneously when they are put in a bad ralher than in a good 
mood (see Schwarz, 1990, for a review).
Positive affective states, on the other hand, inform individuals that their cur­
rent environment is a safe place. Accordingly, individuals in a good mood may 
be more likely to take risks and to use simple heuristics in information process­
ing. Moreover, they may have better access to a variety o f different procedural 
knowledge, given that no specific procedure is activated to cope with the current 
situation. In combination, this may facilitate the higher creativity that has been 
observed under elated mood, but may inhibit the spontaneous use of effortful 
analytic processing strategies, unless they arc required by other active goals. 
Again, a considerable body o f research supports this assumption (see Schwarz, 
1990, for a review).
In a related vein, lsen and colleagues (lsen, 1984; lsen & Levin, 1972; lsen, 
Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982) suggested that individuals in a good mood 
may avoid cognitive effort that could interfere with their ability to maintain their 
pleasant affective slate. If so, persons in a good mood may be unlikely to 
elaborate the message for that reason. The prediction of a more analytic reason­
ing style under bad mood, on the other hand, is more controversial. Severely 
depressed slates have also been found to accompany decreased motivation (e .g ., 
Beck, 1967; Peterson & Seligman, 1984) and may thus decrease the likelihood of 
message elaboration. Moreover, negative events, which trigger negative moods, 
may attract a high degree of attention, thus limiting the cognitive capacity that 
individuals have available for working on other tasks, as will be discussed
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below. Note, however, that experimentally induced moods are usually not very 
severe, rendering a depression-like decrease in motivation unlikely.
In combination, these considerations suggest that analytic elaborations o f the 
quality of persuasive arguments may be more likely when recipients are in a bad 
rather than a good mood at the time of exposure to the message. In contrast to the 
preceding hypotheses, this notion predicts an interaction effect o f niuod and 
argument quality, rather than a main effect of mood. Specifically, recipients o f a 
persuasive message that presents strong arguments should be more persuaded 
when they are in a bad, rather than in a good mood. On the other hand, recipients 
o f a message that presents weak arguments should be more persuaded when they 
are in a good, rather than in a bad mood. Moreover, this interaction of mood and 
message quality should be obtained on attitude change measures as well as on 
measures o f recipients' cognitive responses, reflecting the impact o f mood on 
message elaboration.
In addition, the motivational hypothesis results in different predictions for 
different processing stages, an issue to which we shall later return in more detail.
E. COGNITIVE CAPACITY HYPOTHESES
As a fifth hypothesis, affective states may influence recipients' ability to 
elaborate the message in various ways. Specifically, the presence o f mood- 
related thoughts may decrease subjects’ information-processing capacity and 
may thus interfere with their ability to elaborate the message. However, it is 
unclear whether good moods or bad moods are more likely lo have this inter­
ference effect.
On the one hand, it has been suggested that positive mood increases the 
accessibility o f positive material, which is assumed to be more extensive and 
more interrelated in memory (Isen et at., 1982; Matlin & Stang, 1979), Thus 
positive mood could potentially elicit a great number of positive thoughts. Many 
of these thoughts may not be relevant for the processing of the persuasive 
communication and may thus reduce the capacity for the processing of this 
message.
On the other hand, negative events that elicit bad moods may be more likely to 
stimulate a search for explanations (e.g., Abcle, 198S; Bohner, Bless, Schwarz, 
& Strack, 1988; Schwarz, 1987; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), and this may also 
interfere with (he performance of other (asks. Note, however, that such an 
interference may be less likely in experiments than in natural situations, bccause 
the introduced negative event has limited implications and can usually not be 
changed, thus limiting the necessity and adaptive value of extensive event- 
related analyses. Similarly, Ellis and Ashbrook's (1988) resource allocation
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model holds that depressed states may decrease individuals' cognitive capacity, 
and this assumption is well supported by memory research (see Ellis & Ash- 
brook, 1988, for a review).
Finally, affective slates may influence an individual’s arousal level, which in 
turn has been shown to have curvilinear effects on cognitive capacity (Kahne- 
man, 1970). Because this latter possibility pertains to the intensity rather than the 
valence of affective slates, however, it will not be considered in detail.
In general, the cognitive capacity hypotheses predict an interaction of affective 
state and message quality, as do the motivational hypotheses. Specifically, indi­
viduals whose cognitive capacity is reduced by iheir current affective state 
should be less persuaded by strong arguments, and more persuaded by weak 
arguments, than individuals whose cognitive capacity is not affected. Moreover, 
this interaction should be obtained on measures of attitude change as well as on 
measures of recipients’ cognitive responses, reflecting the impact of cognitive 
capacity on message elaboration. However, whether being in a good or a bad 
mood is more likely to reduce individuals’ cognitive capacity remains an open 
issue. Finally, like the motivational hypotheses, the capacity hypotheses result in 
different predictions at different processing siages, as will be discussed laler.
The fact that the capacity and motivational hypotheses generate potentially 
identical predictions raises the question of how the two may be distinguished. It 
seems that a mood-induced lack of motivation to engage in effortful analyses of 
the content of the message may be overridden by other attempts to motivate 
recipients lo pay attention to the quality of the message presented to them. Such 
attempts should show little effect, however, if recipients do not have the required 
cognitive capacity at their disposal. Conversely, giving recipients sufficient time 
lo process the content of a message despite restricted cognitive capacity may 
overcome the impact of limited capacity, but may show little effect if individuals 
are not motivated to engage in effortful processing strategies. We shall later 
return to this issue in more detail.
Let us now review experimental findings that bear on the impact of recipients’ 
mood at the time of exposure to a persuasive communication.
III. Mood at Exposure and the Processing of 
Persuasive Messages
A. IS '"HERE AN INFLUENCE?
To begin wilh a real world illustration, suppose that you want to use a public 
telephone. But before you can place your call, you are approached by a person 
who asks you to let him make his own call first. Would you be more likely to
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comply with this request if you were in a good rather than in a bad mood? 
Probably yes, as a considerable number of studies on mood and helping behavior 
suggest (see Isen, 1984; Schaller & Cialdini, in press, for reviews). But more 
germane to the present issue is the following: Would the quality of this fellow’s 
excuse make more of a difference when you are in a good mood or when you are 
in a bad mood?
To explore this issue, Bohner (1988) conducted a field experiment with 52 
users of a public telephone in a German city. Half of the subjects happened to 
find a one-deuische mark (DM) coin in the telephone booth, equivalent to half a 
United States dollar, while the others did not. Pretests demonstrated that finding 
a coin did improve subjects’ current mood.
In the main experiment, subjects were approached by a confederate who asked 
them for permission to advance in line and to make her own call first. This was 
done after subjects had or had not found a coin, but before they could place their 
telephone call. For half of the subjects, the confederate provided a reasonable 
excuse, by informing the subject that she had to contact her boss, who would 
only be in his office for another 5 minutes. For the other half, the confederate’s 
request was not accompanied by a plausible reason.
Overall, subjects’ mood did not influence their compliance. While 63% of the 
good-mood subjects complied with the confederate’s request, the same was true 
for 66% of the control group subjects. Thus, no main effect of mood was 
obtained. On the other hand, subjects were twice as likely to comply with the 
confederate’s request when a plausible reason was given (85%) than when it was 
not (44.5%). This latter finding, however, depended on subjects’ mood. Specifi­
cally, 39% of the control group subjects, who did not find a coin, complied with 
the request without receiving a plausible reason, whereas 92% complied when a 
reason was provided. Good-mood subjects, on the other hand, who did  find a 
coin, were not significantly affected by the quality of the excuse. They complied 
with the request independently of whether it was accompanied by a plausible 
reason (75%) or not (50%). Although this pattern did not result in a significant 
interaction, the simple main effect of type of excuse was significant for subjects 
in a neutral mood, but insignificant for subjects in a positive mood. Thus the 
findings o f this field experiment suggest that subjects in a good mood may be less 
likely to pay attention to the quality of a request than subjects in a nonmanipu­
lated mood.
A related laboratory experiment (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990) 
provides more systematic insight into the impact of good  and bad  moods on 
recipients’ processing of persuasive counterattitudinal communications that pre­
sent strong or weak arguments. Subjects were 87 female students at a German 
university. To induce a good or bad mood, subjects were first asked to provide a 
vivid report of a pleasant or an unpleasant life event, purportedly to help with the 
construction of a “ Heidelberg Life-Event Inventory.”  They were encouraged to
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relive ihe event in their mind’s eye, and to provide a vivid description of the 
event and the feelings that accompanied it. Subjects were given 15 minutes to 
complete their report. This procedure resulted in a reliable difference on a manip­
ulation check {"H ow  do you feel right now, at this very mom ent?,”  I =  “ very 
bad”  and 9 =  “ very good” ; M  =  7.0 for the positive, and 6.1 for the negative 
event conditions, respectively).
As part o f a purportedly independent second study, subjects were subsequently 
exposed to a tape-recorded communication that presented either strong or weak 
arguments in favor o f an increase in student services fees. Some of the subjects 
were informed that this second study was concerned with language comprehen­
sion, whereas others were told that the study was concerned with the evaluation 
of persuasive arguments. To provide an attitude baseline, a nonfactorial control 
condition was included, in which subjects were neither exposed to a mood 
manipulation nor to a persuasive message, but only reported their attitude toward 
an increase in student services fees.
For the time being, we will restrict our discussion to the language comprehen­
sion conditions because these conditions are most relevant to the impact o f mood 
slates on subjects’ spontaneous processing of persuasive messages. We shall 
later return to the impact o f moods under conditions where subjects are explicitly 
instructed to pay attention to message quality. After listening to one of Ihe taped 
messages, subjects’ attitudes toward an increase in student services fees, their 
cognitive responses to the message, their memory for the message’s content, and 






Good Mood Bad Mood Control Group
Fig. 1. Altitude change as function o f  mood and message quality. ( • .......• ) ,  Strong message
quality; ( + ------ + ), weak message quality. Adapted from B less, Bohner, Schwarz, and Slrack (1990,
Ex penmen! I).
Attitude
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As shown in Fig. 1, subjects in a bad mood reported more favorable attitudes 
toward an increase in student services fees when they were exposed to strong 
arguments than when they were exposed to weak arguments (see Table I, pre­
sented below, for the significance of comparisons between individual means). 
Subjects in a good mood, on the other hand, were equally persuaded by strong 
and  by weak arguments, and showed moderately positive attitude change, irre­
spective o f the quality of the arguments. This suggests that subjects in a good 
mood may have been less likely to elaborate the specific content o f the message 
than subjects who were in a bad mood.
This conclusion is supported by an analysis o f subjects’ cognitive responses. 
Specifically, subjects in a bad mood reported a higher proportion of favorable 
thoughts in response to strong rather than weak arguments, as shown in the top 
panel o f  Fig. 2. Similarly, they reported a higher proportion of unfavorable 
thoughts in response to weak rather than strong arguments, as shown in the 
bottom panel o f Fig. 2. Thus, the cognitive responses of subjects in a bad mood 
reflect systematic elaboration of message content. Not so, however, for subjects 
in a good mood. Neither the proportion of favorable, nor the proportion of 
unfavorable, thoughts reported by these subjects differed as a function of argu­
ment strength, indicating a low degree o f systematic message elaboration.1
Nevertheless, when subjects were subsequently asked to rate the quality o f the 
presented arguments, these ratings were unaffected by their affective stale. 
Rather, subjects in a good as well as in a bad mood rated the weak arguments as 
less convincing (M  =  3.5) than the strong arguments (M  =  6.0, along a scale of 
1 =  not strong at ali to 9 =  very strong), with no indication of a mood effect 
whatsoever (all F  values <  I). This suggests that subjects in a good mood did 
note the quality of the arguments, at least when explicitly asked, but did not 
spontaneously consider it in making their attitude judgments.
Conceptually equivalent findings were obtained in a number o f other studies, 
which will be reviewed shortly, all indicating that the observed interaction of 
mood and argument strength on measures o f attitude change and cognitive re­
sponses is a robust and reliably replicable finding (Bless et a!., 1990, Experiment 
2; Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, in press; Innes & Ahrens, in press; Mackie & 
Worth, 1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987). In combination, these results support the 
hypothesis that the impact of mood on persuasion is mediated by its impact on 
subjects’ processing strategies. While subjects in a bad (Bless et al., 1990, 1991) 
or in a nonmanipulated mood (Innes & Ahrens, in press. Experiment 2; Mackie 
& Worth, 1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987) spontaneously elaborated the content of 
the message according to a central route o f persuasion, subjects in a good mood
‘The absolute number o f cognitive responses reported by subjects was not affected by the manip­
ulations, and about one-third o f  the responses were coded as "neutral”  or "irrelevant" thoughts (see 
Bless e t a t., 1990. for details).















Fig. r Cognitive responses us u function o f m ood and message qualily ( • ...... • ) ,  Strong m es­
sage quality; ( + ------+ ), weak message quality.
did not do so. The interaction effects o f mood and argument strength obtained in 
these studies are incompatible with the mood-as-peripheral-cue hypothesis and 
the mood-congruenl-recall hypothesis. As noted before, these hypotheses predict 
main effects o f mood rather than interaction cffects of mood and message quali­
ty. Accordingly, they cannot account for the observed effects— which is not to 
say that they are generally invalid, an issue to which we shall return later.





Good Mood Bad Mood
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Finally, the change-in-criteria hypothesis introduced above may in principle 
generate an interaction prediction, but cannot account for the present findings 
because subjects’ ratings o f argument quality were unaffected by their mood 
state.
B. HOW CRUCIAL ARE SUBJECTS’
COGNITIVE RESPONSES?
While the parallel effects on measures o f attitude change and recipients' cog­
nitive responses suggest that the impact o f mood on attitude change is mediated 
by its impact on recipients’ cognitive elaboration of the message, a more direct 
test of this mediating assumption would be welcome. If this assumption is 
correct, the observed interaction of mood and message quality should be affected 
by other variables that are known to influence message elaboration. According to 
the elaboration likelihood and the heuristic/systematic model, the amount of 
message elaboration is determined by the recipient’s motivation and ability to 
process the message, and variables like distraction, personal relevance, repeti­
tion, and prior knowledge can decrease or increase message elaboration (cf. 
Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken, Libcrman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 
1986b). Most importantly, disiraction has been shown to interfere with the 
systematic processing of a message. Distracted subjects are less likely to gener­
ate favorable cognitive responses in reaction lo strong arguments or negative 
cognitive responses in reaction to weak arguments. As a consequence, distrac­
tion reduces the differential impact of strong and weak messages (cf. Petty & 
Brock, 1981), as has been discussed in the context of the capacity hypothesis.
Accordingly, one can test the hypothesis that the impact of mood on persua­
sion is mediated by its impact on subjects' cognitive responses by introducing a 
distraction manipulation. If subjects in a bad mood arc likely lo elaborate the 
message, introducing a distraction manipulation should eliminate the advantage 
of strong over weak arguments. If subjects in a good mood are not motivated, or 
not able, to process the content o f the message to begin with, introducing a 
distractor task should not affecl their responses.
To test this hypothesis, 75 female subjects were pul in a good or bad mood, 
and were exposed to strong or weak arguments (Bless el aL, 1990, Experiment 
2), replicating the procedures used in the study reported above. In addition, half 
of the subjects were distracted while they listened to the message. Specifically, 
these subjects had to solve simple computation tasks that were presented on 
slides while they listened to the tape. Again, the manipulation check, as de­
scribed above, revealed a reliable mood difference of about one scale unit (M = 
6.4 and 5.5, for good and bad mood conditions, respectively).
As shown in Fig. 3, the data o f the nondistracted subjects replicated the
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Fig. 3 Auiiudc change as a function o f mood, message quality, and distraction. ( • ...... • ) .  Strong
message quality; ( t ------+  ). weak message quality. Adapted from Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, and
Slrack (1990, Enperimenl 2).
previous findings. Again, subjects in a bad mood were persuaded by strong but 
not by weak arguments, whereas subjects in a good mood were moderately 
persuaded by both messages. However, introducing a distractor task during 
exposure to the message eliminated the advantage of strong over weak arguments 
under bad mood conditions. Subjects in a good mood, on the other hand, were 
not affected by the distractor task, presumably because they did not elaborate the 
message to begin with.
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This conclusion is again supported by an analysis of subjects’ cognitive re­
sponses. Separate analyses under each distraction condition indicated that non- 
dislracted subjects in a bad mood reported a higher proportion of favorable and a 
smaller proportion o f unfavorable thoughts in response to the strong rather than 
the weak arguments. However, this pattern was significantly less pronounced 
when bad-mood subjects were distracted than when they were nol. The cognitive 
responses reported by subjects in a good mood, on the other hand, were not 
affected by the distraction manipulation, again paralleling the attitude change 
data.
Although the quality o f the arguments affected neither altitude judgments nor 
cognitive responses o f distracted and/or good-mood recipients, it should be 
noted that when explicitly asked to evaluate the quality o f the arguments, sub­
jects in all mood and distraction conditions were able to differentiate between 
strong and weak arguments. This finding excludes the possibility that the distrac­
tion task may have been too involving and may have inhibited any meaningful 
processing of the message. Moreover, by replicating previous studies (Bless et 
al., 1990, Experiment I; Mackie and Worth, 1989), this finding supports the 
idea that the formation of an attitude judgment and the perception of the quality 
of the arguments should be considered as being at least partly independent of 
each other. It seems plausible to assume that the formation o f an attitude judg­
ment requires more and deeper processing than the mere evaluation of the quality 
of message content.
In summary, the obtained results indicate that the impact o f moods on recip­
ients’ responses to persuasive messages is mediated by their impact on respon­
dents' elaboration of the content o f the presented arguments. They are consistent 
with the predictions generated by the motivational hypotheses as well as by the 
capacity hypotheses. We shall now turn to the limited dala thal bear on their 
relative merit.
C. DIFFERENTIAL MOTIVATION OR 
DIFFERENTIAL CAPACITY?
As mentioned previously, one may assume that a mood-induced lack o f moti­
vation lo engage in effortful analyses of the content of the message may be 
overridden by other attempts to motivate recipients to pay attention to the quality 
of the message presented to them. Such attempts should show little effect, 
however, if recipients do not have the required cognitive capacity at their dis­
posal. Conversely, giving recipients sufficient time to process the content o f a 
message despite restricted cognitive capacity may overcome the impact o f lim­
ited capacity, but may show liule effect if individuals are not motivated to 
engage in effortful processing strategies. Three studies bear on these considera­
tions.
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In one study, part o f which we already discussed (Bless et a i .  1990, Experi­
ment 1), recipients’ motivation to elaborate message content was independently 
manipulated. Half o f the subjects were informed that the study was concerned 
with the evaluation of arguments, and they were explicitly instructed to pay 
attention to the arguments. The remaining subjects, on the other hand, were told 
that the study was concerned with language comprehension, to direct their atten­
tion to content-unrelated features o f message presentation. As discussed above, 
and shown in Figs. 1 and 2, these latter subjects were more likely to spon­
taneously elaborate the message when they were in a bad rather than in a good 
mood. However, how does subjects' mood at the time of encoding influence 
message elaboration when subjects' are explicitly instructed to pay attention to 
the quality of the presented arguments? Most importantly, do subjects in a good 
mood engage in message elaboration under this condition? Table I shows the full
TA BLE I
A t t i t u d e  C h a n c e  a s  a  F u n c t i o n  o f  M o o d , M e s s a g e  Q u a l i t y , 
a n d  F ocus o f  A t t e n t i o n “
Focus o f  attention
On arguments On language
Good m ood Bad mood Good mood Bad mood
Attitude change
Approval
Strong arguments s . r 7.3" 4.6* 5.4*
Weak arguments 3 .0 3 .0 4 7* 3 .0
Recommended fee
Strong arguments 53.98* 59 29 ' 51.11 54 .0 0 ’
Weak arguments 47.78 45.63 5 6 .4 3 ’ 48.75




Strong arguments .19 .37 .14 .31
W eak arguments .19 .15 .16 .06
Unfavorable thoughts
Strong arguments .48 .33 .55 .35
Weak arguments 54 .49 .50 .59
"Means with an asterisk differ significantly from the control group at p <  .OS. The 
recommended fee is given in dcuticbcmarks; the possible range o f values for approval is I 
("strongly disapprove” ) lo  9 ("strongly approve"), Adapted from Bless, Buhner, Schwarc. 
and Slract (1990. Experiment I).
MOOD AND PERSUASION 177
pattern of results. As comparisons with the nonfactorial control group indicate, 
subjects in a good mood were influenced by strong arguments but not by weak 
arguments when Ihey were explicitly instructed to evaluate the quality of the 
arguments. Without this explicit instruction, however, good mood subjects were 
equally influenced by strong as well as by weak argument, as discussed earlier. 
Subjects in a bad mood, on the other hand, were influenced by strong but not by 
weak arguments, irrespective of whether they were instructed to pay attention to 
the quality of the arguments or not. Thus, being in a bad mood seems func­
tionally equivalent to being instructed to focus on the quality o f the presented 
arguments, and either o f these manipulations resulted in a differential impact of 
strong and weak arguments.
These findings bear on the hypothesis that the impact o f mood states on 
message elaboration may be mediated by motivational factors rather than by 
capacity constraints. If subjects in a good mood were severely restricted in their 
processing capacity, simply instructing them to pay attention to the quality of the 
arguments should be unlikely to overcome these constraints. Note, in this regard, 
that the persuasive messages were presented from a tape, at a fixed speed, thus 
eliminating the possibility that subjects could spend more time on processing the 
message when instructed to pay attention to the quality o f the arguments. If they 
were not motivated to process the message in any detail, on the other hand, 
despite having the necessary capacity at their disposal, increasing their moti­
vation to do so by explicit instructions should overcome the molivational defi­
cits, much as the above findings indicate. Accordingly, we consider these find­
ings 10 support the motivational, rather than the capacity, hypothesis.
In a related vein, Innes and Ahrens (in press, Experiment 2) observed that 
instructing subjects “ to imagine themselves in the siluation of having been 
requested to lead a round table discussion to introduce ideas on the issue" 
presented in ihc message, eliminated the impact o f being in an elated rather than 
a neutral mood. Specifically, elated subjects given this instruction differentiated 
between strong and weak arguments, whereas elated subjects who were in­
structed “ to read the message as if they had to present an appraisal of the 
contents to another group for class discussion" did not. Although it remains an 
open issue why the first instruction increased subjects’ motivation to elaborate 
the content of the message, whereas the second did not, the data converge with 
ihe findings of Bless et at. (1990, Experiment I) by indicating that processing 
instructions may override the impact o f affcctivc states. Accordingly, lnnes and 
Ahrens (in press) concluded that the impact of mood stales is mediated by 
molivational variables rather than by decreased cognitive capacity.
However, the available evidence is mixed. In an explicit test of the cognitive 
capacity hypothesis, Mackie and Worth (I9K9) manipulated the amount of time 
that subjects had available for processing the message. In two experiments, with 
different mood inductions and different topics, a persuasive message with strong
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or weak arguments was presented to subjects in a positive or a nonmanipulated 
mood. Half o f the subjects were informed that the message would appear on a 
computer screen for a limited amount o f time, “just long enough . . . to read the 
message through once" (p. 28). The other subjects were informed that they 
could proceed from reading the message to completing the dependent measures 
“ whenever they were ready. Thus, these subjects were aware that they could 
look at the speech for as long as they wanted”  (p. 29).
The authors found that offering subjects more lime to process the message 
increased good-mood subjects’ elaboration to a level that no longer differed from 
neutral-mood subjects’ elaboration, as indicated by similar patterns o f subjects’ 
cognitive responses and attitude judgments, as well as correlations between the 
favorability o f content-related cognitive responses and attitude change. They 
concluded from this pattern that good-mood subjects were apparently motivated 
to process the message, or else they would not have spent more time on it when 
they had the chance to do so. Accordingly, Mackie and Worth (1989) attributed 
elated subjects' limited message elaboration under restricted exposure lime to 
limited processing capacity.
Note, however, that an alternative interpretation of these findings in lerms of 
instructional differences is not implausible. Specifically, telling subjects that 
they may use as much time as they want to read the message, and may go over it 
again, may implicitly convey that the experimenter is interested in a carefully 
considered response to the message, quite in contrast to telling subjects that time 
is just sufficient to read the message oncc. If so, Mackie and W orth's (1989) 
unlimited exposure time condition may be similar to the explicit instruction of 
Bless el at. (1990) to pay attention to the quality o f the arguments, whereas their 
limited exposure time condiiion may resemble the instruction by Bless ei al. to 
focus on language comprehension. On the other hand, subjects who were in­
structed to pay attention to the quality of the arguments in the Bless el al. study 
may have taken more lime to think about the message before they reported their 
attitude judgment. Although the exposure time of the tape-recorded message 
itself was constant across conditions, it is possible that subjects look more or less 
lime to form a judgment, and data on this possibility are not available. Similarly, 
subjects in Jnnes and Ahrens’s (in press, Experiment 2) study may have spent 
more time reading the persuasive message under the processing instructions that 
were found to reduce the impact o f being in an elated mood.
In summary, additional research is needed to distinguish between the moti­
vational and cognitive capacity hypotheses. Most importantly, this research will 
need to manipulate processing capacity in ways lhal are not open to a moti­
vational reinterpretation. For the lime being, we conclude from the finding that 
subjects in an elaied mood were able to process the content of the message if 
explicitly instructed to do so, lhat the hypothesized constraints on processing 
capacity that may be induced by elaied moods are unlikely to be very severe.
MOOD AND PERSUASION 179
IV. Mood at the Time of Judgment
The findings reported so far indicate that recipients’ affective states influence 
ihe style in which they process persuasive communications. In all reported stud­
ies. however, mood was induced directly before the message was presented and 
attitude judgments were assessed immediately afterward. As the messages used 
were all rather short, subjects' mood was probably still pronounced when altitude 
judgments were made. Accordingly, the impact of mood state may have occurred 
at the encoding stage, i.e ., when subjects received the message, as well as at the 
judgment stage, i.e ., when subjects responded to the dependent variables. Re­
call, however, that different process assumptions make different predictions 
about the processing stage at which recipients' affective state is likely lo affect 
the persuasive impact of the message, as discussed in the introduction. An 
evaluation of their relative merit does therefore require separate explorations of 
the impact of mood stales at the encoding as well as the judgment stage.
To address this issue, Bless and Schwarz (Bless et al.. 1991, Experiment 1) 
conducted a study in which a positive or negative mood was induced either 
before encoding or after encoding but before judgment. The mood induction was 
identical to the one used in the Bless ei al. (1990) studies described above, with 
significant differences of about two scale units on the manipulation check. Sub­
jects were exposed to the strong or weak counterattitudinal messages used in the 
Bless et at. (1990) studies under instructions that were designed to prevem 
subjects from forming online judgments.2 Attitude judgments were assessed after 
a delay of 15 minutes, so that positive or negative mood could be induced either 
before the message was presented or before attitude judgments were made. 
Moreover, this delay guaranteed that the mood that was induced before message 
presentation had dissipated by (he time the attitude judgment was made.
When good or bad moods were induced before the message was presented, the 
results replicated the previously reported findings: As shown in Table 11, differ­
ential effects o f strong versus weak arguments were obtained for subjects in a bad 
mood, but not for subjects in a good mood. As the confound o f mood and 
processing stage common to the previous studies was avoided, these results 
indicate that Ihe impact o f mood on recipients' encoding of the presented mes­
sage is sufficient to obtain an interaction o f mood and argument quality.
However, the impact o f subjects' mood was not restricted to the encoding 
stage. Rather, mood effects on subjects’ processing strategy could also be ob-
2Specifically , [he cover story inform ed subjects that various lexis were being pretested for a study 
on "language com prehension ,”  and a number o f  questions was presented that focused on various 
linguistic aspects o f  the m essage. These instructions were all intended to prevent subjects from 
making attitudinal judgments during encoding o f  the message by directing their attention to the form 
rather than the content o f  the communication.
180 N. SCHWARZ. H. BLESS, AND G. BOHNER
TABLE II
A t t i t u d e  C h a n c e  a s  a  F u n c t i o n  o f  M o o d , T i m i n g  o f  M o o d  
I n d u c t i o n , a n d  A r g u m e n t  Q u a l i t y "
Timing o f  mood induction
Before encoding Before judgment
Positive Negative Positive Negative
mood mood mood mood
Approval
Strong arguments 3.6 4.1 5.2 3.8
Weak arguments 3.4 1.9 1.6 2.3
Recommended fee
Strong arguments 48.50 54.29 54.33 50.50
Weak arguments 50.56 49.38 46.50 48 30
“The possible range o f values for approval is I ( “ strongly disapprove” ) 
to 9 ("strongly approve” ). The recommended fee is given in deutsche marks. 
Adapted from Bless, M ackie, and Schwarz (1991, Experiment I).
served a( the judgment stage. If subjects were exposed to the message in a neutral 
mood, but positive or negative moods were induced before the attitude judg­
ments were made, the interaction of mood and message quality showed a re­
versed pattern. Although all subjects were affected by the quality of the argu­
ments, this effect was significantly more pronounced for subjects in a good 
mood, who reported more extreme judgments than subjects in a bad mood.
We assume that this pattern of results again indicates that subjects in a good 
mood simplified their processing task. Specifically, subjects who were in a good 
mood al the time of judgment may have been less likely to recall detailed 
representations of the presented arguments than subjects who were in a bad 
mood. Rather, they may have relied on a global evaluative representation, such 
as “ These were pretty good argum ents,”  in forming an attitude judgment. If 
subjects in a bad mood, on the other hand, tended to use detail-oriented process­
ing strategies, they may have recalled more of the presented information, includ­
ing arguments that were less convincing. If so, the present findings would 
parallel previous research, conducted in other content domains, that indicated 
that simplifications of judgmental processes, due tosuboptimal information (Lin- 
ville, 1982) or insufficient processing time (Strack, Erber, & Wicklund, 1982), 
may result in more extreme judgments. Most important, Linville & Jones (1980) 
observed that subjects provided more extreme judgments the less information 
about the target was available. Linville suggested that the likelihood of extreme 
judgments may decrease the more information is considered in making the judg-
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ment, reflecting lhat a wider range of information may draw attention to different 
implications. Similarly, Strack et al. (1982) observed greater reliance on a single 
piece of salient information under lime pressure, again resulting in more extreme 
judgments. Thus, the extremity of judgments may decrease when individuals 
consider a wider range of detailed information with potentially different implica­
tions. If so, the above findings may reflect lhat recipients’ mood state influenced 
the amount of information thaï they considered in making a judgment.
To provide a direct test o f this hypothesis, Bless and Mackie (see Bless et al., 
in press, Experiment 2) conducted a study in which subjects were induced to 
form either a global or a detailed representation of the persuasive message 
presented to them. As in the previous studies, subjects received a counterat- 
titudinal communication that presented either strong or weak arguments, again 
under instructions designed to prevent online aiiitude judgments. Subsequently, 
half of the subjects were required to evaluate the perceived quality of the argu­
ments, whereas the remaining subjects were asked to indicate the number of 
different arguments presented to them. Whereas the first task was designed to 
form a global evaluative representation, the second task was designed to form a 
more differentiated, detail-oriented representation. In fact, forming this more 
detailed representation look subjects almost twice as long as simply judging the 
perceived quality of ihe arguments.
Following this task, subjects were put in a good, neutral, or bad mood and 
were asked to report iheir attitudes on the issue. Specifically, subjects in whom 
positive mood was to be induced walched a 5-minute video clip taken from the 
television comedy show “ Saturday Night L ive,”  whereas subjects assigned to 
the neutral mood condition watched a 5-minute segment on wine corking. Sub­
jects assigned to the negative mood condition saw a 5-minute video report on a 
summer camp for children with cancer. Manipulation checks revealed a signifi­
cant impact of these manipulations on subjects’ mood, with means of M — 7.2, 
6.0, and 4.1, for the positive, neutral, and negative conditions, respectively, 
along a scale with endpoints labeled “ sad”  (1) and “ happy”  (9).
The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that subjects in good and 
bad moods rely on different representations of the message, as shown in Table 
111. If subjecis had previously formed a global evaluative representation of the 
message, the differential impact of strong and weak arguments was more pro­
nounced for subjects in a good or a neutral mood, than for subjects in a bad 
mood. This indicates that subjects in a positive or neutral mood were more likely 
to use global representations, which have been demonstrated to lead to more 
extreme judgments than more detailed representations (Judd & Lusk, 1984; 
Large & Vega, 1989; Linville & Jones, 1980). Subjects in a bad mood, on the 
other hand, were apparently less likely to rely on a global representation, even 
though it was easily accessible.
If no global representation of the content of the message had previously been
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TABLE III
A t t i t u d e  C h a n c e  a s  a  F u n c t i o n  o f  M o o d , T y p e  o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n , 
a n d  A r g u m e n t  Q u a l i t y "












Positive mood 5 .9 3.2 3.9 4.1
Neutral mood 6 .0 3.8 4 .3 3.2
Negative mood 4 .5 3.5 4.1 3.1
“The possible range o f valuer. Tor agreement is 1 ("strongly disagree") to 
9 ("strongly agree"). Adapted from Bless, Mackie, and Schwarz (J991, 
Experiment 2).
formed, however, the differential impact o f strong and weak arguments was less 
pronounced for subjects in a good mood than for subjects in a neutral or in a bad 
mood. This indicates thal subjects in a bad or a neutral mood were more likely to 
engage in careful processing of a more detailed representation than subjects in a 
good mood. Apparently, the latter subjects formed their judgment by using some 
other heuristic. One simple cue that they may have used is the number of 
different arguments presented (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984a), although the data do 
not allow us to evaluate this possibility.
In summary, subjects in a neutral mood used either a global or a detailed 
representation, depending on which was more accessible. Subjects in a good 
mood, however, preferred a global representation, and made less use o f a more 
detailed one, even if easily available. Conversely, subjects in a bad mood pre­
ferred a more detailed representation, and made less use o f a global one, even if 
easily available.
In combination, the reported findings demonstrate lhat the influence of affec­
tive states on the processing of persuasive communications is not restricted to a 
specific processing stage. Rather, elated moods foster the use of simplified 
processing strategics, and depressed moods the use of more effortful, detail- 
oriented processing strategies, both at the encoding stage and at the judgment 
stage. Depending on the processing stage at which mood has its impact, how­
ever, these strategies result in markedly different effects o f strong and weak 
arguments. At the encoding stage, the advantage of strong over weak arguments 
is increased if recipients are in a bad mood, but decreased if they are in a good 
mood. Conversely, at the judgment stage, the advantage of strong over weak
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arguments is increased if recipients are in a good mood, but decreased if they are 
in a bad mood. Both of these diverging impacts, however, reflect the operation 
of the same general influence of affective slates on individuals’ prefen-ed pro­
cessing strategy,
V. M ood and the Im pact o f P eripheral Cues
The finding that subjects in a good mood relied more on a global representa­
tion of the message than did subjects in a bad mood (Bless et al., in press, 
Experiment 2) is compatible with (he general assumption that reliance on simple 
cues will increase as the systematic elaboration of message content decreases. 
This assumption follows from the elaboration likelihood model (ELM), which 
postulates a "tradeoff between argument elaboration and the operation o f pe­
ripheral cues" (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b, p. 21; see Petty & Cacioppo, 1984b, 
for a more detailed discussion). In the related “ heuristic-systematic model of 
persuasion” (HSM) (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken et al.. 1989), such a trade-off has 
been discussed as the “ attenuation hypothesis”  (Chaiken et al.. 1989, p. 220).
According to this model, however, systematic and heuristic processing may 
also occur simultaneously under certain conditions. Specifically, if motivation to 
process is high, the impact o f heuristic (or "peripheral” ) cues is assumed to be 
enhanced when systematic (or “ central") processing alone does not provide the 
person with sufficient information to assess the validity of the message. This may 
be due to either personal (e.g ., high need for cognition) or situational factors 
(e.g ., if the content is insufficient to form a judgment; see Chaiken et al., 1989, 
p. 226). In eilher case, individuals may consider the content of the message and 
peripheral cues (such as the expertise o f the communicator) in combination to 
assess the validity of the message.
If one assumes (hat being in a negative mood increases the motivation to use 
effortful, detail-oriented processing strategies, whereas being in a positive mood 
increases the likelihood of simplifying processing strategies, different predic­
tions about the impact o f mood states on the processing of noncontent cues may 
be derived, depending on several factors. Suppose that the content of the mes­
sage is sufficient to evaluate its validity, but that reliance on peripheral cues 
allows a reduction in cognitive effort and that a relevant heuristic is easily 
accessible to make sense o f the implications of the peripheral cues (Chaiken, 
1987; Chaiken et al.. 1989). If so, we may expect that individuals in a positive 
mood will be likely to rely on peripheral cues, at the expense o f message 
elaboration. In contrast, individuals in a negative mood should be likely to 
engage in message elaboration, and may pay little attention to peripheral cues, 
given that they can evaluate the message on the basis o f its content.
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Suppose, however, that the content of the message is not sufficient to evaluate 
its validity. If so, individuals in a negative mood may be particularly likely to 
turn to peripheral cues as an additional source of information in their attempt to 
evaluate the validity o f the message. Thus, negative moods may in fact increase 
the processing of noncontent cues, as part o f a detail-oriented and exhaustive 
processing strategy, if the content o f the message seems insufficient to form a 
judgment. We shall now review the limited empirical evidence that bears on 
these hypotheses.
In two studies, Mackie and Worth (1989, Experiment 2; Worth & Mackie, 
1987) explicitly manipulated source expertise independently o f argument 
strength and subjects’ mood. As predicted by the ELM, as well as the HSM ’s 
attenuation hypothesis, positive mood subjects tended to base their attitude judg­
ments more on the expertise cue than did neutral mood subjects. However, the 
obtained impact of source expertise was small and only marginally significant. In 
our reading, there are two plausible reasons that may account for the failure to 
detect the clear-cut mood effects on cue reliance that the attenuation hypothesis 
would predict.
First, the salience o f the expertise cue may have been low, relative to the 
salience of the presented arguments. Specifically, subjects received a short de­
scription of the source, pertaining to its expertise, before a message with eight 
(Mackie & Worth, 1989, Experiment 2) or nine (Worth & Mackie, 1987) argu­
ments was presented. It is conceivable that the single piece of information on 
source expertise was not easily accessible after the presentation of the arguments. 
Consistent with this possibility, Mackie and Worth (1989, p. 34) reported that 
subjects’ judgments o f source expertise were more strongly influenced by argu­
ment strength than by the expertise manipulation.
Second, and more important, Chaiken and colleagues suggested that pe­
ripheral cues, such as source expertise, may not affect attitude judgments unless 
a relevant heuristic (e .g ., “ experts can be trusted’’) is easily accessible at the 
time of judgment (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989). If so, it may be 
important that the cues provided to recipients match the heuristic that is sug­
gested by the purported rationale o f the study. In retrospect, this may not have 
been the case in the studies by Mackie and Worth. Specifically, iheir subjects 
were instructed to pay attention to “ how delegates represent the views of their 
constituents at conferences.”  It is conceivable that ihese instructions increased 
the accessibility o f heuristics that pertained to presentation style rather than 
source expertise, If so, good-mood subjects may have used peripheral cues other 
than the one that was explicitly manipulated, resulting in the surprisingly low 
impact o f the source expertise manipulation.
In contrast to this suggestive evidence for an increased impact o f peripheral 
cues under elated moods, Bohner, Crow, Erb, and Schwarz (in press) observed 
an increased impact o f peripheral cues under depressed moods, when a highly
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salient consensus cue was presented in combinalion with only one piece of 
content information. In their study, 64 subjects were run in individual sessions 
and received positive or negative feedback on a bogus “ Vocational Aptitude 
T est,”  resulting in a reliable mood difference (M =  6,5 and 4.8, for good and 
bad mood conditions, respectively, along a scale from 1 = “ very bad”  to 9 = 
“ very good” ). Following this mood manipulation, each subject was left alone in 
the hall, waiting for another study, to begin a few minutes later. Shortly after the 
experimenter had left the subject alone, he or she was approached by a female 
confederate who was unaware of the subject's mood condition. The confederate 
wore a name tag that identified her as a member o f a (fictitious) local organiza­
tion supporting disabled students. She greeted the subject and asked him or her to 
donate some money to her organization, which would be used to increase the 
accessibility of university buildings through wheelchair ramps (high argument 
quality), or to establish a separate library for disabled students (low argument 
quality). Simultaneously, she showed the subject a sheet with the heading “ List 
o f Contributors," which contained 2 (weak consensus cue) or 19 names (strong 
consensus cue). Thus, the study provided orthogonal manipulations of subjects' 
mood, message quality, and strength of the peripheral cue.
The key dependent variables were subjects' willingness to donate and the 
amount of money donated. After the confederate left, subjects were informed 
that the collection o f money constituted the sccond, independent experiment for 
which they had been waiting, and were asked to list their cognitive responses, to 
rate the usefulness of the alleged cause o f the donation, and to list any details of 
the situation that they could remember.
Table IV shows the percentages of subjects who donated, along with the 
means of the amount donated.3 When a weak consensus cue was presented, the 
willingness to donate was significantly influenced by message quality for sub­
jects in a bad mood, but not for subjects in a good mood, resulting in a significant 
simple interaction of mood and message quality, which again replicates the 
previous findings. The amount of money donated showed a parallel, although 
nonsignificant, pattern. More important, however, presentation of a strong con­
sensus cue influenced only subjects who were in a bad mood, but not subjects 
who were in a good mood. Specifically, subjects in a bad mood were more 
willing to donate, and gave more money, when a strong rather than a weak cue 
was presented. In contrast, no significant impact o f cue strength emerged for 
subjects in a good mood.
Analyses o f subjects’ cognitive responses and their evaluation of the collec­
tion's usefulness revealed patterns that paralleled the behavioral data reported in
JEach subject had at least DM 5 available to donate, because this amount (approximately S3 at the 
exchange rate o f  the lim e), in small change, had been paid tor participation at the beginning o f  the 
alleged first experiment.
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TA BLE IV
P e r c e n t a g e  o f  D o n o r s  a n d  A m o u n t  D o n a t e d  a s  a  F u n c t i o n  o f  
M o o d , S t r e n g t h  o f  C o n s e n s u s  C u e , a n d  A r g u m e n t  Q u a l i t v “
Strength of consensus cue
Slrong Weak
Positive Negative Positive Negative
mood mood mood mood
Percentage o f  donors
Strong arguments 88 88 100 88
Weak arguments 75 88 100 25
Amount donated
Strong arguments 1.94 2.34 2.25 1.75
Weak arguments 2 .16 2.67 2 .30 0.50
"The amount donated is given in deutsche marks. Adapted from Bohner, 
Crow, Erb. and Schwarz (in press).
Table IV. In addition, the recall data suggested that subjects in a bad mood 
recalled more details o f the persuasive situation than did subjects in a good 
mood, indicating more extensive processing of both content and noncontent 
information under negative mood.
In summary, subjects in a bad mood were affected by both message quality 
and  the strength o f a nonconient cue, and this influence was reflected in their 
cognitive responses and their overt behavior. In contrast, subjects in a good 
mood were neither influenced by variations in message quality nor by peripheral 
cues. Thus, the results o f this study (Bohner el a i ,  in press) apparently contra- 
diet the findings reported by Mackie and Worth (1989, Experiment 2; Worth & 
Mackie, 1987), reviewed above. However, both sets o f Findings seem compati­
ble if one takes the HSM’s “ sufficiency criterion”  (Chaiken et al., 1989) into 
account. According to that criterion, recipients may consider peripheral cues as 
an additional source of information if the content o f the message is insufficient to 
evaluate its validity. If so, the impact o f peripheral cues should reflect an interac­
tion of message quality, bearing on the sufficiency criterion, and recipients' 
mood. Specifically, being in a bad mood may increase systematic processing of 
all potentially available information. If the content o f the message alone is 
sufficient to form a judgment, the attitude judgments and behavioral decisions of 
individuals who are in a bad mood are likely to reflect their elaboration of 
message content. If the content of the message is insufficient, however— for 
example, because very few arguments are presented to begin with— recipients
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who are in a bad mood may use noncontent cues as an additional source of 
information to anive at a judgment. Individuals in a good mood, on the other 
hand, may be willing to use simple decision rules based on heuristic cues. 
Moreover, they may be particularly likely to do so if the judgmental task seems 
complex, as is the case, for example, when numerous different arguments arc 
presented. This raises the intriguing possibility that the impact of peripheral cues 
decreases with message complexity for recipients who are in a bad mood, but 
increases with message complexity for recipients who are in a good mood.
While the available data (Bohner et at., in press; Mackie & Worth, 1989, 
Experiment 2; Worth & Mackie, 1987) are consistent with the hypotheses of­
fered above, a more stringent test would be welcome. To provide this test, future 
studies should include orthogonal manipulations of the number o f message argu­
ments and the presentation o f peripheral cues. If our reasoning is correct, the 
direction of the interaction between mood and peripheral cues should directly 
depend on the amount o f content information presented in the message.
VI. Theoretical Implications
We began this article by introducing a number of different ways by which 
recipients’ mood states may influence the impact o f persuasive messages. We 
shall now turn to an evaluation of these possibilities and shall finally discuss the 
implications of the present findings for current models o f affective influences on 
cognitive processes, broadly conceived.
A. MOOD AND PERSUASION
I. Evaluation o f Hypotheses
The studies reviewed in the present article most clearly support the notion that 
recipients' affective states may influence the extent of argument processing. In 
line with previous suggestions about the impact o f affective states on individuals’ 
strategics o f information processing (Schwarz, 1990), individuals in an elated 
mood were found to be less likely to engage in extensive processing of the 
presented arguments than individuals in a nonmanipulated or a mildly depressed 
mood. Accordingly, all studies showed significant interaction effects of recip­
ients’ mood states and the quality o f the arguments presented to them. Moreover, 
these effects emerged under conditions that may be considered to reflect moder­
ate elaboration, and were eliminated under conditions o f decreased or increased
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elaboration. Thus, decreasing the amount o f elaboration by a distractor task 
(Bless et at., 1990, Experiment 2), as well as increasing the amount o f elabora­
tion by instructing subjects lo pay attention to the arguments (Bless et at., 1990, 
Experiment 1) or by providing additional time for processing (Mackie and 
Worth, 1989), eliminated the effects o f mood on the amount o f processing. 
However, neither under decreased nor under increased elaboration conditions did 
we observe evidence for mood effects that could not be attributed to mood’s 
impact on message elaboration, contrary to some of the hypotheses we derived 
from the literature.
To begin with the change-tn-criteria hypothesis, the presented findings did not 
support the notion that recipients in a bad mood may be more critical o f any 
message presented to them than recipients in a good mood. While recipients in a 
bad mood did engage in a more critical examination of the presented arguments, 
they did appreciate the quality o f strong arguments and were more influenced by 
them than were recipients in a good mood. Moreover, when recipients were 
explicitly asked to rale the quality o f the presented arguments, their ratings did 
not differ as a function of their mood state (Bless et at., 1990, Experiment 1). 
Accordingly, we found no support for the folk wisdom that people in a bad mood 
are more likely to react negatively to just about anything, whereas people in a 
good mood may be generally uncritical. Rather, our findings suggest that indi­
viduals evaluate argument quality independently of their mood state, provided 
that their attention is drawn to the issue, contrary to what the change-in-criteria 
hypothesis would suggest. However, individuals in different mood states seem to 
differ in the extent to which they spontaneously elaborate the implications of the 
message and use these elaborations as a basis for their attitude judgments. As a 
result we find that individuals in a bad mood are not generally less likely to be 
influenced— they are only less likely to be influenced by poor arguments.
Similarly, we found no support for the mood-congruem-recalt hypothesis, 
which holds that recipients' mood may influence the valence of the thoughts that 
they generate in response to the persuasive message or the communicator. Note, 
however, that mood congruent recall may be most likely for strongly valenced 
self-related material (cf. Blaney, 1986). If so, support for the hypothesis may be 
detected in content domains that are more clearly self-related, e .g ., pertaining to 
the quality o f recipients’ marriage or to recipients’ self-concept.
With regard to the feetings-as-information hypothesis, the findings are less 
conclusive. This hypothesis holds that individuals may use their perceived affec­
tive reaction to the attitude object, or to the communicator, in making a judgment 
according to a "H ow  do 1 feel about it?" heuristic (Schwarz & Clore, 1988). In 
doing so, they may misread their preexisting mood stale as a reaction to features 
o f the persuasive situation, resulting in more favorable judgments when they are 
in a good rather than in a bad mood, unless the informational value of their 
current feelings is discredited (e.g ., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Although these
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predictions received considerable support in experiments that assessed complex 
judgments (see Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1988, for reviews), the pre­
dicted main effect of mood did not emerge in the present persuasion experiments. 
Moreover, differences in recipients' attitude judgments were accompanied by 
parallel differences in their cognitive responses, contrary to the predictions made 
by the feelings-as-information assumption.
Note, however, that the quality of the presented arguments affected recipients' 
attitude judgments and cognitive responses only when they were in a bad mood, 
but not when they were in a good mood at the time of message exposure. This 
raises the question, on which basis, other than message quality, recipients in a 
good mood may have formed their attitude judgment? It is conceivable that these 
subjects did in fact consult their feelings in making an altitude judgment, result­
ing in similarly positive judgments irrespective o f message quality. Obviously, 
additional experiments that manipulate the perceived informational value of re­
cipients’ mood by introducing misattribution manipulations are needed to pro­
vide an adequate lest o f this hypothesis. In general, however, this possibility is 
nicely compatible with the theoretical assumptions made. If individuals in a good 
mood attempt to simplify the judgmental process, reliance on the "H ow  do I feel 
aboul it?”  heurislic would provide an efficient way to do so. Moreover, they 
should be the more likely to use this heurislic the less other easily accessible 
information allows them to form a judgment without loo much effort.
In line with this assumption, we observed that recipients did nol differentiate 
between strong and weak messages when they were in a good mood at the time of 
encoding. However, their attitude judgments clearly reflected message quality 
when they had formed a simple evaluative representation of the message whiie in 
a neutral mood, bul had to form an attitude judgment while in a good mood. We 
offer the conjecture that this pattern of findings reflects that elated subjects based 
their attitude judgment on the informational implications of their feelings, unless 
they had the even simpler opportunity to recall a previously formed global 
evaluation of the message.
In addition, the present findings suggest an alternative interpretation for a 
previous study thai has been interpreted as supporting the operation of the “ How 
do 1 feel about i(?” heuristic in a persuasion context. Specifically, Schwarz, 
Servay, and Kumpf (1985) exposed heavy smokers to a fear-arousing movie that 
vividly portrayed the negative side effects o f smoking. Relative to a control 
group that was not exposed to the movie, subjects who saw the movie reported a 
higher intention to cut down the number o f cigarettes smoked. This intention was 
less pronounced, however, when subjects could misattribute their affective reac­
tions to a placebo pill thal was said to have arousing side effects. Subjects who 
were informed that the pill had tranquilizing side effects, on the other hand, 
reported a higher intention to reduce smoking than did subjects who had not 
expected side effects from the pill.
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These discounting and augmentation effects (Kelley, 1972) were interpreted to 
indicate that subjects used their affective reactions to the movie as a basis for 
evaluating the described risk, resulting in the perception o f the highest risk when 
they experienced arousal “ despite" being tranqullized, and In the perception of 
the lowest risk when (hey could attribute their arousal to the pill. In light o f the 
present theorizing, one may alternatively assume that recipients’ feelings of fear 
prompted them to elaborate the strong arguments presented in the fear-arousing 
movie, but that the impact o f their feelings on message elaboration was cut short 
when they misaltributed their feelings to another source. Specifically, subjects 
who attributed their arousal to the side effects of the pill may have seen little 
reason to elaborate the message (and may instead have been thinking about the 
risks involved in taking pills). If so, the obtained results would reflect the use of 
one’s affective state as a basis for making decisions about which information to 
attend to, rather than as a basis for evaluating the described risk per se.
In retrospect, the Schwarz ei al. (1985) study nicely illustrates the shortcom­
ings o f studies that use only one level o f message quality. Specifically, affective 
influences that are mediated by their impact on message elaboration can only be 
distinguished from other mediating processes if at least two levels of message 
quality are introduced. In the present case, the feelings-as-information hypoth­
eses advanced by Schwarz et al. (1985) would predict effects o f fear and its 
perceived cause that are independent o f message quality, whereas the fear- 
induced-elaboration hypothesis considered here would predict an interaction of 
this factor with message quality. The same methodological point holds for the 
other hypotheses considered here. For example, had we constrained ourselves to 
the use o f weak arguments in the studies reported in this article, the obtained 
results would have been equally compatible with the change-in-criteria or mood- 
congruent-recall hypotheses as with the mood-induced-elaboration assumption.
2. Music, Food, and Pleasant Circumstances
The same methodological issue renders it difficult to determine the ap­
plicability o f the present analysis to the large body of research that explored the 
impact o f music, food, or other pleasant situational influences on recipients' 
yielding to persuasive messages. For example, Janis, Kaye, and Kirshner (1965; 
see also Dabbs & Janis, 1965) observed more pronounced attitude change when 
recipients were eating while reading a persuasive communication than when they 
were not, whereas Galizio and Hendrick (1972) found a similar impact of pleas­
ant music (see also Gom, 1982; Milliman, 1982, 1986). In a related vein, 
Rosnow (1968; see also Corrozi & Rosnow, 1968) reported that exposure to 
rewarding or punishing events influenced the effectiveness o f two-sided per­
suasive communications. Unfortunately, these and related studies were typically 
restricted to the use of a single level o f message quality. Their findings may
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therefore be interpreted in a conditioning framework (which was preferred by 
most of these authors), or may be construed to reflect the impact of affective 
slates on processing style. Specifically, if we assume that the presented argu­
ments were not very strong, the observation that exposure to pleasant stimuli 
increased persuasion relative to control conditions would parallel the findings 
reviewed in the present article. In fact, Dabbs and Janis's (1965) suggestion that 
pleasant activities may create a momentary “ mood o f compliance”  is nicely 
compatible with the more process-oriented account offered here.
Alternatively, however, we may construe the same findings as reflecting the 
use of the ‘‘How do I feel about it?”  heuristic (Schwarz & Clore, 1988). In line 
with this latter hypothesis, Gom, Goldberg, and Basu (1990) observed that 
exposure to pleasant or unpleasant music influenced subjects' evaluation o f a 
consumer product only under conditions where their attention was not drawn to 
the nature o f the music. When subjects were explicitly asked to evaluate the 
music before evaluating the consumer product, however, the latter judgments 
were unaffected by the type of music presented. As Gom et at. (1990) note, this 
may reflect that drawing subjects’ attention lo the potential impaci of the music 
may have discredited their current feelings as a basis of judgment, much as 
suggested by Schwarz and Clore (1983, 1988). In fact, differences in subjects’ 
awareness of the source o f their feelings may underlie the apparently conflicting 
results obtained in studies concerned with the impaci o f background music on 
consumer behavior (see Gom, 1982; Kellaris & Cox, 1989; Milliman, 1982,
1986).
As this discussion indicates, it is impossible to determine the mechanism that 
underlies an observed impact o f pleasant stimulation on attitude change in the 
absence o f  experimental conditions that include variations of message quality. 
Accordingly, the design of future research in this area will need to reflect the 
potential complexity of higher order interactions identified in this article.
3. Applied Implications
Turning to the applied implications o f the reviewed research, we note that 
putting recipients in a good mood when we want to influence them may not 
always be a good idea. Specifically, when we have strong arguments to present 
in favor o f our case, recipients' good mood may reduce their impaci by inierfer- 
ing with recipients' systematic elaboration of the message. This interference is 
particularly undesirable because attitude change via a central route of persuasion 
has been found to be more stable than attitude change via a peripheral route (cf. 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b). Accordingly, strong arguments are likely to be more 
persuasive, and the induced attitude change is likely to be more resistant to 
change, when the arguments are delivered to an audience that is in a neutral or 
mildly depressed mood. Weak arguments, on the other hand, are more effective
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when recipients do not elaborate them. Therefore, if we have nothing compelling 
to say, putting the audience in a good mood may be a smart choice— much as 
many advertisers seem to have known for quite a while (cf. Stayman, Aaker, & 
Bruzzone’s, 1989, content analysis o f television spots).
B. AFFECT AND INFORMATION PROCESSING
i .  Informational and Motivational Functions
o f Affective States
In a broader theoretical context, the present findings illustrate that individuals' 
affective states may have a strong impact on the strategies that they use to 
process information. As a growing body of literature indicates (see Fiedler, 
1988; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1991, for reviews), individuals’ cog­
nitive performance on a wide variety o f tasks may be profoundly influenced by 
the affective stale Lhey arc in. These influences may be conceptualized by assum­
ing that affective states may serve informative functions (see Schwarz, 1990; 
Schwarz & Bless, 1991, for a more detailed discussion). As many authors 
pointed out (e .g ., Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1988; Higgins, 1987; Ortony, Clore, & 
Collins, 1988), different affective states are closely linked to different psycho­
logical situations. In Frijda's (1988) words, “ emotions arise in response to the 
meaning structures o f given situations, [and] different emotions arise in response 
to different meaning structures.”  In general, “ events that satisfy the individual’s 
goals, or promise to do so, yield positive emotions; events that harm or threaten 
the individual’s concerns lead to negative em otions" (p. 349).
For the purpose of the present argument, we assume that the relationship 
between emotions and the “ meaning structures” that constitute a “ psychologi­
cal situation”  (Higgins, 1987) is bidirectional; While different psychological 
situations result in different emotions, the presence o f a certain emotion also 
informs the individual about the nature of its current psychological situation. At a 
general level, we may assume that a positive affective state informs the indi­
vidual that the world is a safe place that does not threaten the person's current 
goals. That is, positive feelings tell us that our current situation is neither charac­
terized by a lack of positive outcomes, nor by a threat o f negative outcomes. 
Negative affective states, on the other hand, inform the individual that the 
current situation is problematic, and that it is characterized either by a lack of 
positive outcomes, or by a threat of negative outcomes. If so, one’s affective 
state could serve as a simple but highly salient indicator o f the nature of the 
situation one is in. Indeed, empirical evidence indicates that different emotions 
are associated with different stales o f “ action readiness" that are evident in 
physiological changes {e.g., Lacey & Lacey, 1970; Obrist, 1981) and overt
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behavior (e .g ., Ekman, 1982; Izard, 1977), as well as in introspective reports 
(e.g ., Daviiz, 1969; Frijda, 1986, 1988). Accordingly, many theories of emotion 
hold that “ emotions exist for the sake of signaling stales o f the world that have to 
be responded to, or that no longer need response and action" (Frijda, 1988, p. 
354).
These considerations suggest that individuals' processing strategies may be 
tuned to meet the requirements o f the psychological situation that is reflected in 
their feelings. If negative affective states inform the individual about a lack of 
positive, or a threat o f negative, outcomes, the individual may be motivated to 
change his or her current situation. Attempts to change the situation, however, 
initially require a careful assessment o f the features o f the current situation, an 
analysis o f their causal links, and explorations of possible mechanisms of change 
and their potential outcomes (cf. Bohner et al., 1988). Accordingly, it would be 
highly adaptive if negative feelings increased the cognitive accessibility o f pro­
cedural knowledge that is adequate for handling negative situations. Increased 
accessibility o f this procedural knowledge, however, would also increase the 
likelihood that the respective procedures are applied to other tasks that one works 
on while in a bad mood, resulting in a generalized use of analytic reasoning 
procedures under bad mood when they are applicable (cf. Higgins, 1989). More­
over, individuals may be unlikely to lake risks in a situation that is already 
considered problematic, and may therefore avoid simple heuristics as well as 
novel solutions. Accordingly, their thought processes may be characterized by 
what Fiedler (1988) called "lightening," a term borrowed from Kelly (1955).
If positive feelings inform the individual that his or her personal world is 
currently a safe place, on the other hand, the individual may see little need to 
engage in cognitive effort, unless this is required by other currenlly active goals. 
In pursuing these goals, the individual may also be willing to take some risk, 
given that the general situation is considered safe. Thus, simple heuristics may 
be preferred to more effortful, detail-oriented judgmental strategies; new pro­
cedures and possibilities may be explored; and unusual, creative associations 
may be elaborated. Moreover, a diverse body of procedural knowledge may be 
equally accessible, given that no specific procedure was activated to deal with a 
problematic situation, further increasing the potential for unusual solutions. Ac­
cordingly, the thought processes of individuals in a positive affective stale may 
be characterized by what Fiedler (1988) has called "loosen ing ."
2. Some Limiting Conditions
These conjectures predict numerous mood-induced differences in processing 
style, for which considerable support can be found in a diverse body of literature 
(see Schwarz, 1990, for a review and discussion). It is important, however, to 
consider a number of limiting conditions. First, the increase in analytic perfor­
194 N. SCHWARZ. H. BLESS, AND G. BOHNER
mance under the influence of a bad mood may be limited by the extern to which 
handling the negative situation itself binds a considerable degree of subjects’ 
cognitive capacity, thus restricting the individual’s capacity to work on an unre­
lated task. The underlying assumption that negative states may have a disruptive 
impact on information processing has a long tradition in psychological theorizing 
(see Easterbrook, 1959, for an early review). In the persuasion domain, it is 
reflected in findings that indicate a disruptive effect of pronounced temporary or 
chronic fear on the processing of persuasive messages (see iepson & Chaiken, 
1990). Moreover, any potential advantage of different processing styles cannot 
be observed if individuals are not motivated to work on a task to begin with, as is 
frequently the case under severe depression. Accordingly, the literature on de­
pressive realism (see Ruehlman, West, & Pasahow, 1985, fo ra  review) suggests 
that severe depression, in contrast to being in a “ depressed m ood," is unlikely to 
improve analytic performance. It is interesting to note, however, that phe­
nomenological studies of the subjective experience of severe depression (see 
Tolle, 1982, for a review) indicate that the experience of “ sadness”  or of 
“ being in a bad mood” is not part of the melancholic state that characterizes 
severe depression. Thus, the subjective experiences that accompany severe de­
pression may be of a different nature than the “ normal”  negative affective states 
considered in the present article. Moreover, the experiences associated with 
severe depression are likely to endure over extended periods of time with limited 
variation, and may therefore lose whatever informational value they may have 
had at their onset.
Finally, other currently active goals (cf. Srull & Wyer, 1986) may override the 
impact of affective states, as has been demonstrated in the Bless et al. (1990, 
Experiment 1) study reviewed above. Note, however, that the present argument 
implies that it should be easier to induce individuals in a good mood to use an 
analytic processing style than to induce individuals in a bad mood to use a 
heuristic style. If positive feelings inform us that no action is needed, overriding 
this message due to other action requirements poses no problem. In contrast, if 
negative feelings inform us about current problems, ignoring this message would 
not be adaptive. Accordingly, one may expect that the impact of negative feel­
ings on processing style is more immune to the influence of other variables than 
is the impact of positive feelings. Obviously, future research should address 
these plausible limitations.
For the time being, however, we note that the informative functions approach 
to the interplay of affect and cognition (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; 
Schwarz & Bohner, 1990) provides a heuristically fruitful framework for con­
ceptualizing the impact of affective states on individuals’ spontaneous use of 
processing strategies. Most important, the basic assumption that affective states 
may serve informative functions is clearly in line with a long tradition o f theoriz­
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ing about the nature of emotions (see Frijda, 1986, 1988, for reviews), and it 
invites an explicit consideration of what the specific information is that may be 
provided by different moods and emotions. One may expect that current explora­
tions of the conditions that give rise to different emotions (e.g ., Higgins, 1987; 
Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Ortony et a /., 1988; Weiner, 1985), as well as 
research on people’s knowledge about their emotions (e.g ., Stein & Levine,
1987), will result in a more precise understanding of their respective informa­
tional value. In principle, one may assume that affecL-elicited cognitive tuning is 
the more functional for an organism, the more closely different types of emotions 
correspond to different situational requirements. If so, future insights into situa­
tional determinants of emotions are likely to allow more precise specifications of 
the processing requirements that are signaled by different affective states, 
providing a theoretical basis for more specific predictions about the impact of 
different moods and emotions on strategies of information processing.
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